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1 Introduction
This paper studies the role of asymmetric information and learning in a New Keynesian
framework in which both private agents and the monetary authority have imperfect knowl-
edge about the true model of the economy. We focus on short run dynamics or, more
generally, on the dynamics that can develop when beliefs have not yet converged to an
asymmetric information rational expectations equilibrium. In this environment, a rich and
complex variety of interactions between beliefs and actions can potentially emerge, with
important consequences on the time series patterns of the variables of the model.
In a large number of situations and contexts, it is reasonable to assume that two or
more interacting agents have asymmetric information about the environment in which they
operate. In this work, we consider a model of the economy in which private agents observe
neither policy shocks nor the monetary policy rules that are implemented by the central
bank, whereas the monetary authority observes neither technology shocks nor the beliefs
that private agents possess when forming their expectations. We assume that economic
agents employ all of the information that they have available to estimate the aspects of the
true data generating process which are unknown to them, and that they use a statistical
learning algorithm to revise their beliefs as new data become available. In each period, these
updated beliefs will be the basis for the decisions of both the policy maker and the private
agents.
An extensive literature in economics focuses on the analysis of monetary policy in en-
vironments that are characterized by imperfect knowledge and learning. Some recent con-
tributions to this literature stream include studies by Barnett and Ellison (2011), Bullard
and Mitra (2002), Cho et al. (2002), Cogley et al. (2011), Evans and Honkapohja (2006),
Honkapohja and Mitra (2005), Marcet and Nicolini (2003), Milani (2008), Orphanides and
Williams (2005), and Bullard and Eusepi (2005).1 A large part of the research in this area
focuses on the conditions under which the economy converges to a determinate rational ex-
pectations equilibrium (REE) and on the role of monetary policy in achieving this result.
2 In this branch of the literature, two-sided learning was rst studied in the seminal work
of Marcet and Sargent (1989), who describe a general framework upon which most of the
ensuing research (including this paper) is built. The previously published investigations
that most closely approach the current study include a study by Bullard and Eusepi (2005),
1For additional references, Evans and Honkapohja (2009) provide an extensive review of this literature.
2Bullard and Mitra (2002), for instance, investigate this issue for a variety of alternative policies under the
assumption that the central bank adopts Taylor-type instrument rules. By contrast, Evans and Honkapohja
(2003, 2006) focus on expectations-based targeting rules that are obtained from the optimization of the
central banks objective function (Svensson (2002) strongly argues that these rules are superior to Taylor-
type policy rules because they reect optimal behavior by the central bank).
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who investigate two-sided learning in the context of a New Keynesian framework, but do
not explicitly model the central banks decision problem and endow both the central bank
and private agents with the same information set. Honkapohja and Mitra (2005), study
convergence to rational expectations equilibria under two-sided learning but use a di¤erent
framework with respect to the perceived laws of motion of private agents and policymakers;
moreover, they also do not explicitly model the central banks decision problem. Evans and
Honkapohja (2003) introduce an optimizing central bank but use substantially di¤erent as-
sumptions about the perceived laws of motion of agents and their respective information sets
(in particular, they do not consider structural shocks that are only observed by some agents
in the economy). Some other interesting contributions are Barnett and Ellison (2011), who
build two-sided learning into a version of Sargent (1999), and Giannitsarou (2005), who in-
vestigates convergence to rational expectations equilibria under di¤erent learning algorithms
in a model that is similar to the framework of Marcet and Sargent (1989).
Our paper departs from most of the previous literature on two-sided learning with respect
to the assumptions about policymakers behavior and the focus on short- and medium-
run dynamics. More specically, our framework assumes that both private agents and the
monetary authority have incomplete knowledge of the true data generating process and that
they adopt the same approach to address their lack of full information: they form beliefs
using the data that they have available in each period, and then reach optimal decisions
on the basis of these beliefs. In addition, the substantially di¤erent assumptions about the
central banks knowledge and behavior in our framework also implies that the focus of our
analysis is not on the ability of the monetary authority to enforce a particular equilibrium;
instead, the focus of this paper is on the short-run dynamics that the interactions of beliefs
and actions between private agents and policymakers can generate. To our knowledge, the
study of optimal policymaking and two-sided learning in an environment characterized by
asymmetric information has not yet received a great deal of attention, particularly in the
context of the business cycle dynamics of a New Keynesian model.
With respect to learning, we assume that both private agents and the monetary authority
use statistical models to estimate and predict the behavior of variables for which they do not
know the true data generating process. They update their estimates as new data becomes
available using a recursive learning algorithm. These assumptions follow the large branch of
the learning literature that originates from Marcet and Sargent (1989), Cho et al. (2002),
and Evans and Honkapohja (1998). However, similarly to Cogley et al. (2011), the agents
perceived laws of motion in our framework have the important feature of incorporating
the cross-equation restrictions that originate from their respective beliefs. Because of the
complex relationships between parameter updates and optimal decisions, the actual law
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of motion for the variables in the framework that is examined in this study cannot be
characterized analytically. For this reason, we study the impact of asymmetric information
and learning in a number of simulations that are performed using standard parameter values
for this model.
Our results indicate that two-sided learning can signicantly alter the dynamics of the
model. More specically, we nd that two-sided learning may generate large departures of
the variables of interest from full information rational expectations equilibrium values and
create changes in their behavior in terms of autocorrelations and correlations with the other
variables. We nd that convergence to an asymmetric rational expectations equilibrium
may not occur in our type of framework. Our work also suggests that in this environment,
the communication of information by the central bank does not appear to be e¤ective in
reducing the impact of asymmetric information and learning on the equilibrium dynamics.
To the best of our knowledge, the fact that central bank communication can be harmful if
the central bank has a mis-specied model of the economy is a novel result in the literature.3
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic features
of the New Keynesian model that is analyzed. Section 3 discusses the information that
is available to agents, the learning procedure, and the decision-making approach of our
framework. Section 4 derives agentsperceived laws of motion for the variables of interest
and their implied actual law of motion. Section 5 describes the simulation exercises that we
perform and presents their results. Section 6 concludes.
2 The true model of the economy
The true model of the economy is a standard New Keynesian framework, as developed by
Gali (2008). We assume perfect indexation of prices that cannot be reset to past ination, as
in Christiano et al. (2001); this assumption ensures that the pricing equations are una¤ected
by the presence of positive trend ination, which results in the steady state output level to
be independent of the steady state ination level.4
Given these assumptions, private agentsbehavior in this economy can be described by
the following equations:
yt = E
P
t (yt+1) 
1

 
it   EPt (t+1)  rnt

(1)
3Eusepi and Preston (2010) study central bank communication in a scenario in which only the private
sector is learning. We compare our results with their ndings in section 3 of this paper.
4See Ascari (2004) for a discussion.
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)
t 1 +

(1 + )
EPt (t+1) 

(1 + )
(yt   y) (2)
rnt = r + ut (3)
ut = uut 1 + "
u
t (4)
where yt is output t is the ination rate, it is the nominal interest rate, rnt is the natural rate
of interest and y is the steady state level of output (all the other steady variables drop out
in the equations above). The variable rnt is assumed to be the sum of the steady state real
interest rate r and a technology shock ut; or shock to the real side of the economy, which
evolves according to the AR(1) process described by (4). All variables are in logs. The
parameters ,  and  have standard interpretations, and are obtained from the underlying
problem of consumers and rms; see Gali (2008) for further details. Equations (1) and (2)
have the standard interpretation of an IS equation and a Phillips curve equation. In contrast
to the standard New Keynesian framework, the superscript P in the expectation operator
EPt () in (1) and (2) denotes the fact that at each time t private agents will form these
expectations based only on the information that they have available, which will generally be
di¤erent from the information that is available to policymakers.
In addition to the private sector, the economy is populated by a central bank or public
authority that is assumed to exert some degree of control over the nominal interest rate, and
to use it as its policy instrument. More specically, the central bank is assumed to be able
to set the value of it up to a monetary policy shock vt: Let xt be the value of the policy
instrument that is chosen by the central bank for time t, then the interest rate will be:
it = xt + vt (5)
where vt is assumed to follow the AR(1) process:
vt = vvt 1 + "
v
t (6)
Neither private agents nor policymakers have full knowledge of the economy. In particu-
lar, the central bank does not observe the technology shock and does not know how private
agents form expectations about the future values of the variables of interest and make deci-
sions regarding prices and output. Conversely, private agents are not aware of the policy rule
that the central bank uses to establish xt and do not observe the monetary policy shock. A
more thorough denition of the information set available to each of these two sides is given
next.
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3 Information and decisions
The imperfect and asymmetric information that private agents and the monetary authority
employ in the decision-making process are the central features that di¤erentiate this work
from the previous literature. However, these features require us to postulate certain ad-
ditional assumptions about the way in which each side will use its specic knowledge to
estimate the aspects of the economy that are not known, to make decisions in each period,
and to update its information based on the new data that will be observed.
The state and noise vectors that include all the information available in the economy are:
zt =
h
yt t it ut vt 1
i0
(7)
"t =
h
"ut "
v
t
i0
(8)
As discussed above, the vectors zt and "t are not perfectly observed. In particular, private
agents do not observe the policy shock vt, whereas the central bank does not observe the
technology shock ut. Thus, the vectors of variables that each side will use in their decision
process can be written as follows:
zPt =
h
yt t it ut 1
i0
(9)
zCBt =
h
yt t it vt 1
i0
(10)
or:
zPt =M
P zt
zCBt =M
CBzt
where MP and MCB are simply selection matrices that choose the relevant variables from
the overall state zt:
Private agents use the vector zPt to estimate the policymakers interest rate rule and to
predict the future values of the nominal interest rate. Similarly, the monetary authority
employs zCBt to approximate and predict the behavior of output and the ination rate. We
assume that agents make use of reduced-form regressions for this purpose, thereby estimating
a simple linear relationship between the variables for which they have limited knowledge and
the information that they observe.5 Given this framework, the decision-making process can
5In our model, agents estimate regressions only for variables that they can not control. This assump-
tion contrasts with most of the previous literature on learning, in which agents estimate VARs on all the
equilibrium variables, including their own decision variables.
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be decomposed into two steps. First, private agents and policymakers use the available data
to estimate the parameters of the model. Second, they employ their perceived model of the
economy, together with their estimates of its parameters, to make their respective decisions.
These steps are updated in each period according to the new information that is observed
over time.
3.1 Estimation and learning
Private agents do not know the interest rate rule that the central bank uses to establish the
value of the interest rate. However, they do know that the nominal interest rate a¤ects output
and the ination rate through equations (1) and (2). For this reason, to form expectations
about the future values of these two variables, they form conjectures about the relationship
between it and the variables that they can observe.
We assume that private agents behave like econometricians and estimate the following
simple linear relationship:
it =  tz
P
t 1 + !
P
t
it =  0t +  tt 1 +  ytyt 1 +  itit 1 +  utut 1 + !
P
t (11)
where the error term !Pt simply captures all the determinants of the nominal interest rate
that are orthogonal to the information that is included in the state vector zPt 1.
The central bank has imperfect knowledge about the private side of the economy. How-
ever, the policy decision process requires the monetary authority to hold beliefs about the
way in which the nominal interest rate a¤ects the variables of interest. Similarly to the
assumptions that we made for private agents, we also assume that policymakers behave as
econometricians and estimate simple reduced-form relationships among yt and t and the
state vector zCBt 1 which includes the variables that they can observe:
yt = cytz
CB
t 1 + !
CB
yt (12)
t = ctz
CB
t 1 + !
CB
t (13)
As new data becomes available, private agents will update their estimates of the vector
of coe¢ cients  ; and the central bank will update its estimates of cyt and ct. We assume
that all of the agents in the economy use a standard recursive least squares algorithm (see,
for instance, Evans and Honkapohja, 2001). We focus on the case of decreasing gains, in
which the values of  ; cyt and ct converge to OLS estimates for appropriate gain sequences.
Further details about the learning approach that we adopt in this work are provided in the
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Appendix; the study of additional learning approaches is one of the directions of our future
research.
We augment our learning algorithm with a projection facility. This projection facility
ensures that parameter estimates remain within a predetermined region of values that we
regard as suitable.6 To be specic, we allow agents to make use of three types of projection
facilities. The rst type refers to the coe¢ cients on the ination rate and output in the
perceived and actual policy rules, which are restricted to positive values. The second type of
facility enables private agents to disregard estimates of the policy rule coe¢ cients for which
the solution of the expectational di¤erence equation that they must solve in their decision
process either does not exist or is not unique.7 Finally, the third projection facility allows
policymakers to rule out estimates of (12) and (13) that would cause the perceived law of
motion of the variables of interest to be nonstabilizable. The actual projection facility that
we use implies that if an estimate violates one of the restrictions that we impose, the relevant
agents will construct an estimate by averaging the estimates from the previous two years (8
periods) and use this as their belief. A more formal description of the impact of projection
facilities on the learning algorithm that is adopted in this paper is provided in the Appendix.
Projection facilities might rule out certain potentially interesting dynamics of the vari-
ables of interest. However, in the environment under analysis, which is characterized both
by asymmetric imperfect information and by two-sided learning, it is important to endow
agents with reasonable priors regarding the behavior of the other agents in the economy,
because agentsdecisions are based on beliefs, which are in turn a¤ected by the other sides
past decisions. It follows that it is possible for unreasonable beliefs with respect to the es-
timated coe¢ cients to continue to reinforce each other instead of being redirected towards
more sensible values. Regardless, the simulation section of this paper will provide further
discussion about the role of projection facilities in our simulations.
Because we allow for the presence of trend ination in (2), the true long-run level of
ination in this model is not known and is not constant. However, private agents can
6For a more thorough discussion about the use of projection facilities in a number of learning algorithms,
see Carceles-Poveda and Giannitsarou (2007).
7While it seems reasonable to assume that agents would rule out parameter estimates for which a stable
pattern of the variables in zPt does not exist, the case in which the solution is indeterminate is somewhat more
complex. The analysis of learning in environments in which multiple equilibria could potentially arise requires
not only to take a stand about the method by which one of the alternative solutions should be selected but
also to model the manner in which agents should account for the indeterminacy of the equilibrium as they
update their beliefs. The learning patterns that emerge in this environment could become very complicated.
For this reason, we decided to begin with a simpler scenario in which private agents behave conservatively
and disregard parameter estimates that would create indeterminate equilibria. Nonetheless, we do believe
that the study of two-sided learning in the case of indeterminate equilibria is very interesting, and we intend
to extend our research in this direction in the future.
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estimate trend ination in each period as a function of the estimated monetary policy rule
and the steady state level of the real interest rate. It follows that this framework incorporates
all the features that enable us to investigate the impact of uncertainty in the long-run level
of ination on current decisions, which is a direction we are currently pursuing in parallel
work.
Before proceeding to a description of the decision process, we would like to address one
issue that relates to the structure of the information set and the learning approach that
we assume in this paper. One possible objection to the framework that we are adopting
would be that because the central bank decision makers are private agents after all, it
appears as though they should be able to know the learning problem of the other agents
just by introspection. However, the model could be rewritten with the assumption that each
private agent does not know a priori that all of the other agents use the same forecasting
scheme. Instead, each household (or rm) i could be endowed with a conditional expectations
operator, Eit , that is indexed by i. If we assume that all of these expectation operators
are indeed equal, we can integrate over i, and because we work with a linear model, this
integration would still allow us to arrive at the standard aggregate equilibrium conditions
that are presented above.
3.2 Policy decisions and the formation of expectations
The actual law of motion for the variables in the model is dependent on the decisions of
private agents and policymakers. More specically, private agents use their knowledge of the
private side of the economy and their beliefs about the interest rate rule to form expectations,
which in turn a¤ect the behavior of yt and t through (1) and (2). By contrast, the central
bank uses its beliefs about the processes underlying yt and t to set the policy instrument
xt:
With respect to the private sector, we assume that decisions follow the same timing that
is adopted by Cogley et al. (2011). In particular, this timing involves the following steps.
First, private agents estimate the parameters of the policy rule (11) using information up to
and including time t 1. Then, they observe current period shocks and the value of the policy
instrument and use them in combination with the previously available information to make
decisions on actions. This approach implies that agents enter time t with predetermined
parameter estimates but subsequently use shock realizations from the current period to form
expectations.
The central bank, on the other hand, has the power to decide the value of xt in (5). The
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policy rule for xt8 is chosen by minimizing the expected discounted quadratic loss function:
ECBt 1
1X
j=0
j[(t+j)
2 + y(yt+j)
2 + i(it+j   it+j 1)2] (14)
given (12) and (13), and the estimated values of cyt and ct: The parameters y and i
represent the weights that are attached to the output variable relative to ination and the
relative cost of changing the nominal interest rate, respectively. The superscript in ECBt 1
indicates that expectations are formed with respect to the information set that is available
to the central bank. We do not allow the central bank to react contemporaneously to
monetary policy shocks because the bank could otherwise simply undo any e¤ect of these
shocks on the economy.
In their decisions, private agents and policymakers are assumed to behave as anticipated
utility decision makers (Kreps, 1998); this assumption implies that all the agents will treat
parameter estimates as true values, thus disregarding parameter uncertainty and the e¤ects
of learning. This assumption is common in the literature on learning in macroeconomics (for
instance, see Evans and Honkapohja, 2001).
4 Model solution
Policymakers and private agents base their decisions on their respective perceived laws of
motion (PLMs) for the variables of interest. However, their decisions will a¤ect the true
model of the economy, i.e., the actual law of motion (ALM) of these variables. This section
provides more details about the agentsPLMs, their decision processes, and the resulting
ALM.
4.1 The PLM for the central bank
The central banks PLM for output and ination is dened by equations (12) and (13). Using
the vector zCBt , this PLM can be rewritten in state space form as follows:
ACBzCBt = B
CBxt + C
CB
t z
CB
t 1 +D
CB"CBt (15)
The time subscripts in the matrices of parameters emphasize the fact that the estimates of
cyt and ct in (12) and (13) are updated over time, even if the aforementioned assumption
8Only the current period policy recommendation of the calculated policy rule is actually implemented
since the policy rule is updated every period.
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of anticipated utility implies that policymakers will not account for these updates in their
decision processes. The problem for the central bank is then to nd the sequence fxtg that
minimizes (14) subject to (15) under the assumption of constant parameter values. It is well
known that, under standard conditions, the solution to this problem is linear in the state
zCBt 1; i.e.:
xt =  FtzCBt 1
= f0t + ftt 1 + fytyt 1 + fitit 1 + fvtvt 1
so that the expression for the nominal interest rate becomes:
it = f0t + ftt 1 + fytyt 1 + fitit 1 + fvtvt 1 + vt (16)
If the matrices of parameters in (15) were constant over time, standard results in the optimal
control literature would deliver a time-invariant optimal policy vector F . However, because
the optimization problem in our setup is repeated in every period given updated values of cyt
and ct in (12) and (13), the optimal policy vector will be dependent on the current period
estimates of these parameters.
Given estimates of the parameters for time t and the chosen policy rule, the PLM for the
central bank can be rewritten as follows:
ACBzCBt =
 
CCBt  BCBFt

zCBt 1 +D
CB"CBt
or
zCBt = 1;tz
CB
t 1 + 2"
CB
t (17)
where 1;t =
 
ACB
 1  
CCBt  BCBFt

and 2 =
 
ACB
 1
DCB.
The central bank implements the policy rule dened by (16); thus, the chosen value of
the vector of coe¢ cients Ft will have an impact on the ALM of the nominal interest rate
and, through this impact, will indirectly inuence the ALMs of output and ination.
4.2 PLM for private agents
The PLM for private agents can be obtained from equations (1)   (4) and the perceived
interest rate rule expressed by (11). In matrix form, this PLM may be written as follows:
AP zPt = B
PEpt
 
zPt+1

+ CPt z
P
t 1 +D
P "Pt (18)
11
where the time subscript in the matrix CPt emphasizes the fact that the estimated coe¢ cients
of the perceived policy rule are updated over time. The matrices of coe¢ cients AP ; BP ; CPt
and DP are specied in the Appendix.
Private agents use (18) as the basis for solving the expectation term Ept
 
zPt+1

. As
discussed above, we use the same approach that is employed in Cogley et al. (2011). In more
detail, in every period private agents estimate the coe¢ cients of the perceived policy rule, and
then solve the vector-valued expectational di¤erence equation that features the equilibrium
conditions, including the estimated policy rule. This approach has the important implication
that agents account for cross-equations restrictions when forming forecasts. In addition,
because of our assumptions, the PLM is just the reduced form VAR that is associated
with (18), with reduced form coe¢ cients that are time-varying because they depend on the
estimates of the policy rule coe¢ cients. For this reason, we can guess a solution of the
following form:
zPt =  1;tz
P
t 1 +  2;t"
P
t
This solution can be substituted in for the expectation term to obtain the following equation:
(AP  BP 1;t)zPt = CPt zPt 1 +DP "Pt
This equation, in turn, generates the following equations for the reduced form matrices:
 1;t = (A
P  BP 1;t) 1CPt
 2;t = (A
P  BP 1;t) 1DP
We use Sims(2001) Gensys program to nd the values of  1;t and  2;t. If zPt is determi-
nate, this program delivers the unique nonexplosive solution for these matrices of parameters.
As discussed above, we endow private agents with a projection facility that enables them
to rule out coe¢ cient estimates for which a stable solution does not exist. In addition, we
let private agents employ an additional projection facility that allows them to disregard
estimates of the parameters in AP , BP ; CPt and D that would produce an indeterminate
outcome for zPt : This facility has the consequence of preventing the Gensys program from
randomly selecting a solution that private agents should implement.
4.3 The ALM
The ALM for the variables in the model involves equations (1)  (4); which describe the true
behavior of the private sector, together with the true interest rate rule that is expressed by
12
(16). In matrix form, this ALM can be written as follows:
Azt = BE
p
t
 
zPt+1

+ Ctzt 1 +D"t
The matrices A, B, C and D are dened in the Appendix. Notice that the matrix Ct is time-
variant because it includes the true policy coe¢ cients, which the central bank will update in
each period.
From the PLM for the private sector, we know that the following relationship holds:
Ept
 
zPt+1

=  1;tz
P
t 1
=  1;tM
P zt
which implies:
Azt = B 1;tM
P zt + Ctzt 1 +D"t (19)
It follows that the ALM of the model can be written as:
zt = 	1;tzt 1 +	2;t"t
where:
	1;t = (A B 1;tMP ) 1Ct
	2;t = (A B 1;tMP ) 1D
These last two expressions, which dene the matrices of coe¢ cients in the ALM of the
economy, do not include the matrix  2;t. Therefore, the inclusion of a perceived policy shock
in the PLM of agents is de facto unnecessary.
5 Simulation Exercises
The model that we have described in the previous section involves complex interactions of
beliefs and actions between private agents and policymakers that cannot be solved in closed
form. In particular, although the learning procedure that agents use to update their beliefs
has a recursive structure, the optimization approach of policymakers and the expectation
formation process of private agents are highly nonlinear functions of their estimated para-
meters. For this reason, the equilibrium pattern that is implied by the assumed learning
and decision sequence cannot be characterized analytically. Thus, the main goal of this sec-
tion is to o¤er insights about the role of asymmetric information and two-sided learning in
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the context of the New Keynesian framework that was described in the previous section by
performing a Monte Carlo simulation.
We focus on the short-run (i.e., non-asymptotic) behavior of the endogenous variables in
the model, and we investigate the patterns, magnitudes and durations of the deviations of
these variables from their values in a rational expectation equilibrium. We dene the REE as
the equilibrium that emerges from an environment in which policymakers set a xed policy
rule for the instrument xt in (5) and maintain this policy for the entire simulation period.
During this period, private agents continue to learn and compute expectations using the
procedure that was described in the previous section. The xed policy rule that we use in this
case is a standard Taylor-type rule of the following form: xt = 0:5r+0:5yt 1+1:5t 1+0:5it 1:
Although this specic policy rule is chosen arbitrarily, the lessons that we will obtain from
comparing the model under learning with the rational expectations version would emerge
under virtually any monetary policy rule.9
In addition to the benchmark scenario that incorporates learning and optimal decisions
as described in the previous section, we also perform one additional exercise. We allow the
central bank to communicate its perceived steady state value of ination to private agents.
More specically, we assume that at the end of period t, the central bank announces t,
their time t estimate of the long-run value of ination, which can be calculated using the
policy rule computed in period t. Private agents trust this announcement, and because of
anticipated utility, they regard this announced level of the steady state ination rate as xed
and use it in their regressions. In other words, they estimate the policy rule with the time t
left-hand-side variable being it   it and the right-hand-side variables being deviations from
the implied steady state; it is the sum of the announced steady state ination rate and r.
When making their decisions in the next period, the private agents also use their knowledge
of t. Note that the central bank will update its estimate to t+1 during this subsequent
period. We believe that this setup is interesting because it allows us to study the impact
that a reduction in the asymmetry of the information available to agents produces on the
process of learning. However, because the central bank has imperfect information about the
economy, its communication of t will not necessarily improve economic outcomes. Instead,
policymakersincorrect beliefs about the long-run value of the ination rate could potentially
destabilize the learning and decision process of private agents.
9Ideally, we would like to compare our learning model with a corresponding rational expectations model
featuring asymmetric information (instead of comparing it with a rational expectations model that features
an arbitrary policy rule); however, as we will discover below, our simulations do not allow us to identify
this corresponding asymmetric information rational expectations model. In addition, in our framework the
di¤erential equation approach of Marcet and Sargent (1989) does not provide us with any advantage over
simply running simulations because we would have to solve the ODEs numerically as well, which would be
cumbersome due to the non-linear mapping from parameter estimates to reduced form dynamics.
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In all the simulations, we set the following parameters for the true model of the economy
and the loss function of policymakers:  = 1;  = 0:2; P = CB = 0:99; r = 1=P   1;
y = 1=16 and i = 0:5: For the real shock ut and the policy shocks vt, we assume normal
distributions with the following parameters: 2"u = 0:008
2; 2"v = 0:008
2; 2"v = 0:008
2;
u = 0; v = 0.
10 To initialize the learning and decision process, we must set an initial value
for the private agentsbeliefs. We do this by using population regressions and population
moments from the rational expectation solution of the model that is obtained by applying
the same xed policy rule adopted in the rational expectations scenario. Although the initial
transition path in the simulations is a¤ected by this choice, our conclusions are not.11
We report the results for the case of a recursive learning algorithm with decreasing gains,
as described in the Appendix.12 The value of t0 was set equal to 12. In all of our exercises,
we set the period length to T = 1000, and we performed N = 1000 simulations. We study
the impact of asymmetric information and two-sided learning in the New Keynesian model
under analysis by examining the distributions of the patterns for the variables of interest
and the policy parameters that are obtained from the di¤erent simulations. We show the
median, and 15th and 85th percentile bands of these distributions, and we report their
relevant statistics.13
Figures 1   3 and tables 1   2 provide evidence of the impact of two-sided learning in
this environment and demonstrate that this impact is signicant. Figures 1   3 show the
median as well as the 15th and 85th percentiles of log output, annualized ination and the
annualized nominal interest rate over time. Compared to their distributions in the rational
expectations case, all the variables are more volatile if asymmetric information and two-sided
learning are included in the framework. This increase in volatility occurs for every variable
and is consistent across all of the exercises that we performed. Interestingly, for the nominal
interest rate in the benchmark case of two-sided learning, this increase is not particularly
large, as the volatility of this rate only increases by 30 percent. By contrast, the magnitude
of the volatility increase is quite large for all of the other examined variables. Table 1 shows
that in both exercises, the median standard deviation for the output variable is more than
10We are not advocating uncorrelated exogenous shocks as necessarily constituting the best option for
tting data; however, because we are interested in the relative volatility and persistence of the variables
in our model, we choose to use this simplifying assumption. Our results are robust to the assumption of
autocorrelated shocks (and actually become somewhat stronger under this assumption).
11Carceles-Poveda and Giannitsarou (2007) o¤er a discussion of the di¤erent methods that may be em-
ployed to obtain agentsinitial beliefs in frameworks that are characterized by adaptive learning.
12We also experimented with constant gains, g = 0:015, and we found a much greater volatility for the
variables of interest in this case. As mentioned above, the analysis of the learning patterns under alternative
algorithms is one of the extensions that we intend to pursue.
13If we reported means instead of medians, the di¤erence vis-a-vis rational expectations would be more
striking; however, this result would be driven at least in part by a relatively small fraction of outliers.
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twice its value in the rational expectations case, and the median standard deviation of the
annualized ination rate is more than 6 times its value in the rational expectations case.
This table also highlights the fact that reducing asymmetric information through central
bank communications does not decrease the volatility that is created by two-sided learning.
On the contrary, the median standard deviations of log output and of the annualized nominal
interest rate are higher under this assumption than in the benchmark case.
With respect to policy parameters, we report the distribution of the actual and estimated
coe¢ cients that are associated with the lagged ination rate (gure 4).14 If asymmetric
information and learning are incorporated into the model, the convergence of these two sets
of parameters to xed values is not guaranteed. Because the private agents use di¤erent
variables in their perceived policy rule than the variables that are actually utilized to set
the monetary policy rule, the coe¢ cients on lagged ination (or other variables that appear
in both the perceived and actual policy rules) in the perceived and actual policy rules do
not have to converge to the same values. Thus, the main point worth emphasizing is that
the distribution of the coe¢ cients for both the perceived and the actual policy rules is non-
degenerate even after 1000 periods rather than the simulated values for actual and perceived
policy coe¢ cients being di¤erent.15 This result hints at either the possibility of a failure to
converge to an asymmetric rational expectations equilibrium or the potential existence of
multiple self-conrming equilibria in our model.16 We will discuss below why the convergence
theorems of Marcet and Sargent (1989) do not apply in our setup (and therefore why non-
convergence is an issue that might arises within this framework).
It is interesting that communications from the central bank regarding the estimated
long-run value of the ination rates do not appear to help private agents learn the actual
policy coe¢ cients; as a result, these communications do not appear to reduce the volatility
of policymakers beliefs and policy decisions. As discussed above, the fact that the per-
ceived long-run ination rate is obtained through the use of a mis-specied model has the
potential to destabilize rather than stabilize the learning and decision process, even if these
communications actually reduce the asymmetry of information. This result is conrmed by
gure 7, which depicts the absolute di¤erence in the one-step-ahead ination forecasts by the
14We nd that the other parameters in the policy rule exhibit patterns that are similar to the patterns
that are reported in gure 4.
15We also nd that the projection facility that requires the optimal policy parameters to assume reasonable
values (in this case, a value greater than zero) is invoked in a non-negligible number of the simulations,
particularly in the rst periods of the learning and decision process.
16As discussed above, the framework that we are using, which essentially involves private agents using
their beliefs to solve a rational expectations model every period, renders it infeasible for us to obtain any
analytical results about the existence of multiple self-conrming equilibria using the standard ODE approach
pioneered by Marcet and Sargent (1989).
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central bank and private agents in the last period of the simulations.17 This gure clearly
demonstrates that compared with the baseline asymmetric information environment, this
di¤erence can be much larger in the scenario in which policymakers communicate their be-
liefs regarding long-run ination. In a recent contribution, Eusepi and Preston (2010) discuss
the conditions under which the central banks communication of a (time-invariant) ination
target does not lead to convergence to the rational expectations equilibrium. Although the
results of Eusepi and Preston (2010) have a similar avor to the outcomes of our simulations,
they are obtained by either letting one of the exogenous processes in their model become
arbitrarily close to a random walk or by having price stickiness vanish, producing persistent
exogenous processes. We, on the other hand, have i.i.d. disturbances and a xed level of
price stickiness (as encoded by the slope of the Phillips curve).18
One additional observation can be made from gure 7. The two panels of this gure
emphasize the fact that two-sided learning has important consequences on the ability of
agents to predict future values for the variables of interest, even for the very short run,
i.e., for the one-period ahead forecast. Indeed, di¤erent knowledge and beliefs about the
underlying true coe¢ cients of the model and policy rules will cause private agents and
policymakers to disagree about the predicted patterns of economic variables in the future;
at times, these disagreements may be substantial.
In gure 5, we report the distribution of the autocorrelations of the variables of interest in
the 3 alternative scenarios under analysis.19 This gure indicates that two-sided learning can
potentially increase the persistence of the variables in the model at all orders relative to the
rational expectations case; this increase is often substantial. This result holds for all of the
exercises that we performed and is considerably more pronounced for the scenario in which
we allow the central bank to communicate its perceived long-run value of the ination rate.20
17To control for outliers, we report forecast di¤erences in terms of annualized percentages up to the 80th
percentile of the distribution.
18In the economic literature on information and signal extraction, a number of contributions originating
from the seminal work of Morris and Shin (2002) have investigated the impact of transparency and public
information on social welfare. In general, this research nds that more transparency by the central bank might
be either welfare increasing or welfare decreasing, depending on the precision of the public signal relative to
the private signal and on the weight that private agents attach to the departures of their individual actions
from the aggregate. Our results regarding central bank communication are related to the conclusions of
this literature; however, the focus of our paper is not on the analysis of the relationship between public
information and social welfare; instead, we concentrate on the study of the changes in the dynamics of a
standard New Keynesian model that are caused by the introduction of asymmetric information and learning.
19We report sample autocorrelations that are directly computed from the simulated data.
20Figure 5 somewhat underestimates the possible increase in autocorrelation because we report the median
and 15th and 85th percentile bands. Although the results would look the same for the full information case
if we used the mean autocorrelation, this measure is substantially higher than the median autocorrelation
for the learning models that we consider. We choose not to report mean autocorrelations because these
autocorrelations can be driven by outliers.
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Tables 3 5 report the correlations between variables for the di¤erent cases. The correlations
between log output and ination and between log output and the nominal interest rate do not
appear to be a¤ected by the introduction of two-sided learning. The only relationship that
changes in a relevant manner is the relationship between the ination rate and the nominal
interest rate in the case involving asymmetric information and learning without central bank
communication. In particular, the negative correlation between these two variables becomes
much smaller in this scenario. This result suggests that in this case, the ability of the central
bank to a¤ect the ination rate through its policy instrument might be reduced. On the
whole, we can conclude that two-sided learning has the potential to a¤ect the persistence
of the variables in the models and to alter certain important contemporaneous relationships
between these variables.
Finally, we study the stability properties of the analyzed models. Figure 6 reports the
probability of bad outcomes, which we dene as ination rates higher than 20%, for the
three alternative scenarios.21 In the rational expectations model, in which policymakers set
a xed policy rule and private agents know this rule, this probability is zero. If asymmetric
information and two-sided learning are introduced, the probability of ination rates higher
than 20% becomes positive, and it increases with the length of the sample period under
consideration. In addition, if the central bank is allowed to communicate its beliefs about
the long-run ination rate, this probability becomes quite large, conrming our previous ob-
servation that "naive" communication of information that is based on incorrect beliefs about
the true data generating process can have destabilizing e¤ects on the economy, instead of
facilitating learning and promoting the convergence of perceived and actual decisions. Figure
8 provides further support to this conclusion. The projection facilities that we implement
ensure that private agents and policymakers rule out parameter estimates which, according
to their respective PLMs, would generate explosive patterns of the endogenous variables in
the model. However, as previously discussed, this condition is not su¢ cient to guarantee
the stability of the ALM because in certain circumstances, decisions based on the individual
PLMs could still produce a situation in which one or more eigenvalues of 	1;t are larger
than one in absolute value. Figure 8 indicates that the probability of this type of event is
nonzero, although this probability remains very small in the baseline scenario.22 But when
communication from the central bank to private agents is allowed, this probability becomes
21This probability was computed as the fraction of times in which ination was above the 20% value in
the simulations that we performed.
22The scales in the gure for the baseline case and the scenario involving CB communication are very
di¤erent. In particular, the scale for the CB communication case is much larger than the scale for the
baseline case. One possible reason why we do not observe convergence in the baseline simulations in which
no explosive eigenvalues occur is that the eigenvalues in those simulations are typically still very close to 1
in absolute value, thus e¤ectively halting convergence.
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considerably higher. To obtain further insight into the reasons underlying our results, it
is instructive to compare our framework with the approach of Marcet and Sargent (1989).
Marcet and Sargent (1989) require the ALM to be stable at all times to guarantee con-
vergence to an asymmetric information rational expectations equilibrium. The existence of
periods in our simulations in which the ALM is unstable implies that the convergence re-
sults in Marcet and Sargent (1989) are not applicable in our case, despite the fact that we
endow agents with perceived laws of motion that are always stable23. The result of unstable
dynamics coupled with stable perceived dynamics is also observed in models with one-sided
learning, as discussed in Cogley et al. (2011).
Our exercises suggest that the impact of asymmetric information and two-sided learning
in the context of a New Keynesian model of the economy is signicant. We nd that the
pattern of the variables of the model can change considerably in terms of volatility and auto-
correlations, that undesired outcomes are much more likely, and that signicant di¤erences
between the forecasts of policymakers and private agents with respect to the future values
of the variables of interest can potentially arise. We also show that the communication of
information by the central bank does not necessarily improve private agentslearning of the
true policy coe¢ cients and therefore might not produce a more stable economic environ-
ment. In fact, in our simulations, the scenario in which policymakers disclose their beliefs
about the long-run ination rate is the one that exhibits the highest potential for extreme
outcomes to emerge. This increase in volatility occurs because even though communication
between agents reduces the asymmetry of the information that is employed by agents in
their respective decision processes, these decisions will continue to be based upon each sides
perceptions and imperfect knowledge regarding the true model of the economy.
6 Conclusions
This paper represents a rst attempt to investigate the role of asymmetric information and
two-sided learning in a New Keynesian model of the economy. The assumption that both
monetary authorities and private agents have imperfect knowledge of the true data generat-
ing process, and that they attempt to learn over time from new information that becomes
available, appear to be relatively accurate reections of reality. For this reason, we believe
that the study of the way in which this type of learning process can potentially alter the
dynamics of a New Keynesian framework, which is often used as the basis for policy analysis,
23One caveat is that Marcet and Sargent (1989) require the learning process to start in the domain of
attraction of the ODE that governs convergence to their asymmetric rational expectations equilibrium. We
can not guarantee that we are in this domain of attaraction. We have, however, started our simulations at
substantially di¤erent beliefs and always found similar results.
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is interesting and (hopefully) important. The results of our simulations support this idea by
demonstrating that two-sided learning can cause beliefs and decisions to depart signicantly
from standard rational expectations values. We also emphasize a novel (at least to the best
of our knowledge) aspect of central communication in learning models, namely, we show that
if the central bank has a mis-specied model of the economy, central bank communications
can generate substantially greater volatility, not only for an initial transition period, but
for the entire time period considered in this study. This aspect of our analysis comple-
ments the research and conclusions of Eusepi and Preston (2010), who examine central bank
communication under private sector learning.
The analysis in this paper can be extended in a number of directions. First, the impact of
alternative assumptions regarding the learning approach of agents, such as the use of di¤erent
learning algorithms, could be investigated. Second, we believe that it would be interesting to
further analyze the e¤ects that communication between the agents might produce on their
process of learning about the true data generating process. In this work, we have studied
the case in which policymakers disclose their perceived long-run ination rates to private
agents. Communications involving di¤erent types of information or communications from
private agents to policymakers could also be investigated. Third, the framework that we
employ in this paper allows us to investigate the impact of uncertainty about the long-run
level of ination on current beliefs and decisions, and this investigation also represents a
direction that we are interested in continuing to pursue. Finally, one route that we would
also like to explore is the estimation of our framework using real world data. This extension
would allow us to employ this model to provide an interpretation of past events and to o¤er
more cogent policy recommendations.
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Appendix
Learning algorithm
Let the equations to be estimated by agents be written in general terms as:
qt = p
0
t 1t + t
where qt is the dependent variable or a vector of dependent variables, pt 1 a vector or matrix
of regressors, t the residual(s) and t the vector of parameters of interest. In the case of
private agents, this equation corresponds to (11), while for policymakers it encompasses (12)
and (13). Using this notation, the learning algorithm can be written as:
Rt = Rt 1 + gt
 
pt 1p0t 1  Rt 1

t = t 1 + gtR
 1
t pt 1
 
qt   p0t 1t 1

where gt represents the gain. In the simulations, we focus on Recursive Least Squares (RLS)
learning, in which gt = 1t0+t :
24 However, we also perform some comparative exercises using
Constant Gain (CG) learning, in which gt is a constant positive and small number, i.e.
gt = g, 0 < g < 1. For a more thorough description of these learning algorithms and their
properties, see Evans and Honkapohja (2001); for a discussion of their performance in a few
standard macroeconomic models, see Carceles-Poveda and Giannitsarou (2007).
As mentioned in the main text, the basic learning algorithm will be augmented with
a number of projection facilities. We assume that whenever the value of the estimated
parameters by private agents and policymakers "hits" the projection facility, i.e. moves
outside the predetermined parameter region Q, agents will use an average over past estimates
as the current period estimate. Thus, the algorithm can be rewritten as:
bRt = bRt 1 + gt pt 1p0t 1   bRt 1
bt = bt 1 + gt bR 1t pt 1 qt   p0t 1bt 1
(t; Rt) =
8<:
bt; bRt if bt; bRt 2 Q
(1=N)
PN
j=1 t j; (1=N)
PN
j=1Rt N

if (t; Rt) =2 Q
The specic restrictions that we impose via projection facilities are discussed in the main
text.
24As mentioned in the main text, t0 is set to 12 quarters in our simulations.
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Matrices in the PLMs and ALM
The matrices of the PLM for the central bank can easily be obtained using the state space
representation (15) and the policy rule (16) emerging as a result of the optimization problem.
We have that:
ACBzCBt =
 
CCBt  BCBFt

zCBt 1 +D
CB"CBt
or more explicitly:0BBBBBB@
1 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0
0 0 1  1 0
0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 1
1CCCCCCA
0BBBBBB@
yt
t
it
vt
1
1CCCCCCA =
0BBBBBB@
c1yt c2yt c3yt c4yt c5yt
c1t c2t c3t c4t c5t
 ft  fyt  fit  fvt  f0t
0 0 0 v 0
0 0 0 0 1
1CCCCCCA
0BBBBBB@
yt 1
t 1
it 1
vt 1
1
1CCCCCCA+
+
0BBBBBB@
1 0 0
0 1 0
0 0 0
0 0 1
0 0 0
1CCCCCCA
0B@!
CB
yt
!CBt
"vt
1CA
The PLM for private agents is given by the true equations (1)   (4) together with the
perceived interest rate rule expressed by (11).
yt = E
P
t (yt+1)  1
 
it   EPt (t+1)  r   ut

t =
1
(1+)
t 1 +

(1+)
EPt (t+1)  (1+) (yt   y)
it =  0t +  tt 1 +  ytyt 1 +  itit 1 +  utut 1 + !
P
t
ut = uut 1 + "
u
t
These equations can be rewritten in matrix form as:
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0BBBBBB@
1 0 1

  1

  1

r

(1+)
1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 1
1CCCCCCA
0BBBBBB@
yt
t
it
ut
1
1CCCCCCA =
0BBBBBB@
1 1

0 0 0
0 
(1+)
0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
1CCCCCCAE
p
t
26666664
0BBBBBB@
yt+1
t+1
it+1
ut+1
1
1CCCCCCA
37777775+
+
0BBBBBB@
0 0 0 0 0
0 1
(1+)
0 0 
(1+)
y
 yt  t  it  ut  0t
0 0 0 u 0
0 0 0 0 1
1CCCCCCA
0BBBBBB@
yt 1
t 1
it 1
ut 1
1
1CCCCCCA+
0BBBBBB@
0 0
0 0
0 1
1 0
0 0
1CCCCCCA
 
"ut
!Pt
!
or
AP zPt = B
PEpt
 
zPt+1

+ CPt z
P
t 1 +D
P "Pt
The ALM for the variables in the model can be obtained from the true equations (1)  (4)
together with the true interest rate rule expressed by (16), and can be written in matrix
form as:0BBBBBBBBB@
1 0 1

  1

0   1

r

(1+)
1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0  1 0
0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 1
1CCCCCCCCCA
0BBBBBBBBB@
yt
t
it
ut
vt
1
1CCCCCCCCCA
=
0BBBBBBBBB@
1 1

0 0 0
0 
(1+)
0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
1CCCCCCCCCA
Ept
26666664
0BBBBBB@
yt+1
t+1
it+1
ut+1
1
1CCCCCCA
37777775
+
0BBBBBBBBB@
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1
(1+)
0 0 0 
(1+)
y
fyt ft fit 0 fvt f0t
0 0 0 u 0 0
0 0 0 0 v 0
0 0 0 0 0 1
1CCCCCCCCCA
zt 1 +
0BBBBBBBBB@
0 0
0 0
0 0
1 0
0 1
0 0
1CCCCCCCCCA
 
"ut
"vt
!
or:
Azt = BE
p
t
 
zPt+1

+ Ctzt 1 +D"t
23
References
[1] Ascari, G. , 2004. Staggered prices and trend ination: some nuisances. Review of
Economic Dynamics, 7(3), 642-667.
[2] Brock, W.A., Durlauf, S.N., Nason, J.M., Rondina, G., 2007. Simple versus optimal
rules as guides to policy. Journal of Monetary Economics 54 (5), 13721396.
[3] Barnett, A. and Ellison, M. 2011. Learning by Disinating. Economics Series Working
Papers 579, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
[4] Bullard, J., Eusepi, S., 2005. Did the great ination occur despite policy maker com-
mitment to a Taylor rule? Review of Economic Dynamics 8, 324359.
[5] Bullard, J.B. and Mitra, K., 2002. Learning about Monetary Policy Rules. Journal of
Monetary Economics, 49, 1105-1129.
[6] Carceles-Poveda, E., Giannitsarou, C., 2007. Adaptive learning in practice. Journal of
Economic Dynamics and Control, vol.31, pp. 26592697.
[7] Cho, I.K., Williams, N., Sargent, T.J., 2002. Escaping Nash Ination. Review of Eco-
nomic Studies 69, 1-40.
[8] Christiano, L.J., Eichenbaum, M., Evans, C.L., 2005. Nominal rigidities and the dy-
namic e¤ects of a shock to monetary policy. Journal of Political Economy, University of
Chicago Press, vol. 113(1), pages 1-45, February.
[9] Cogley, T., Matthes, C., Sbordone, A. M., 2011. Optimal Disination Under Learning.
FRB of New York Sta¤ Report No. 524.
[10] Eusepi, S., Preston, B., 2010. Central Bank Communication and Expectations Stabi-
lization. American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 2(3): 235-71.
[11] Evans, G.W., Honkapohja, S., 1998. Economic dynamics with learning: new stability
results. Review of Economic Studies 65, 23-44.
[12] Evans, G.W., Honkapohja, S., 2001. Learning and Expectations in Macroeconomics.
Princeton University Press, Princeton.
[13] Evans, G.W., Honkapohja, S., 2003. Adaptive Learning and Monetary Policy Design.
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 35, 1045-1072.
24
[14] Evans, G.W., Honkapohja, S., 2006. Monetary Policy, Expectations and Commitment.
Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 108(1), pages 15-38, 03.
[15] Evans, G.W., Honkapohja, S., 2009. Expectations, Learning and Monetary Policy: An
Overview of Recent Research. Central Banking, Analysis, and Economic Policies Book
Series, in: Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel & Carl E. Walsh & Norman Loayza (Series Editor),
Monetary Policy under Uncertainty and Learning, edition 1, volume 13, chapter 2, pages
027-076 Central Bank of Chile.
[16] Galí, J., 2008. Monetary Policy, Ination, and the Business Cycle: An Introduction to
the New Keynesian Framework. Princeton University Press.
[17] Giannitsarou, C., 2005. Heterogeneous Learning. Review of Economic Dynamics 6, 885-
906.
[18] Honkapohja, S., Mitra, K., 2005. Performance of monetary policy with internal central
bank forecasting. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 29(4), pages
627-658, April.
[19] Kreps, D., 1998. Anticipated Utility and Dynamic Choice, in D.P. Jacobs, E. Kalai, and
M. Kamien, eds., Frontiers of Research in Economic Theory, (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1998), 24274.
[20] Marcet, A., Nicolini, J.-P., 2003. Recurrent hyperinations and learning. American Eco-
nomic Review 93, 14761498.
[21] Marcet, A., Sargent, T., 1989. Convergence of least squares mechanisms in self-
referential linear stochastic models. Journal of Economic Theory 48, 337368.
[22] Milani, F., 2008. Learning, monetary policy rules, and macroeconomic stability. Journal
of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 32(10), pages 3148-3165, October.
[23] Morris, S., Shin, H. S., 2002. The Social Value of Public Information. American Eco-
nomic Review 92, 1521-1534.
[24] Orphanides, A., Williams, J., 2005. The decline of activist stabilization policy: natural
rate misperceptions, learning and expectations. Journal of Economic Dynamics and
Control 29, 19271950.
[25] Sargent, T., 1999. The Conquest of American Ination. Princeton University Press,
Princeton, NJ.
25
[26] Sims, C.A., 2001. Solving Linear Rational Expectations Models. Computational Eco-
nomics 20, 1-20.
[27] Svensson, L.E.O., 2002. Ination Targeting: Should it be Modeled as an Instrument
Rule or a Targeting Rule? European Economic Review, 46, 771-780.
26
Figures and Tables
Figure 1 - Log output
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Note: Median value and 15th and 85th percentile bands of the simulated pattern for log
output. The panels report the following scenarios: 1) REE; 2) benchmark asymmetric
information and learning case; 3) central bank communication.
Figure 2 - Annualized ination
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Note: Median value and 15th and 85th percentile bands of the simulated pattern for the
annualized ination rate. The panels report the following scenarios: 1) REE; 2) benchmark
asymmetric information and learning case; 3) central bank communication.
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Figure 3 - Annualized nominal interest rate
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Note: Median value and 15th and 85th percentile bands of the simulated pattern for the
annualized interest rate. The panels report the following scenarios: 1) REE; 2) benchmark
asymmetric information and learning case; 3) central bank communication.
Figure 4 - Selected policy coe¢ cients - response to the ination rate
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Note: Median value and 15th and 85th percentile bands of the simulated actual and estimated
policy response to the ination rate. Each row reports a di¤erent scenario: 1) benchmark
asymmetric information and learning case; 2) central bank communication.
28
Figure 5 - Autocorrelations
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Note: Median value and 15th and 85th percentile bands of the autocorrelations of the vari-
ables of interest in the performed simulations. Each row reports a di¤erent scenario: 1) RE;
2) benchmark asymmetric information and learning case; 3) central bank communication.
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Figure 6 - Probability of ination larger than 20%
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Note: Probability of ination exceeding 20%. The panels report the following scenarios: 1)
RE; 2) benchmark asymmetric information and learning case; 3) central bank communica-
tion.
Figure 7 - Absolute di¤erence ination forecast
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Note: Absolute di¤erence in the one-step ahead ination forecasted by the Central Bank
and private agents. The panels report the following scenarios: 1) benchmark asymmetric
information and learning case; 2) central bank communication.
Figure 8 - Probability of explosive ALM
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Note: Probability of eigenvalues larger than 1 in absolute value in the ALM. The panels
report the following scenarios: 1) benchmark asymmetric information and learning case; 2)
central bank communication.
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Table 1 - Median standard deviations relative to the RE case
variable benchmark CB comm.
output 2.3539 2.6698
annualized ination 7.9535 6.1471
annualized interest rate 1.3287 2.0812
Table 2 - Standard deviations, RE case
variable standard deviation
output 0.0092
annualized ination 0.4537
annualized interest rate 3.4487
Table 3 - Correlations in the RE case
correlations - RE case
yt t it
yt 1 0.7874 -0.8461
t 0.7874 1 -0.7342
it -0.8461 -0.7342 1
Table 4 - Correlations in the benchmark case
yt t it
yt 1 0.6474 -0.6524
t 0.6474 1 -0.2876
it -0.6524 -0.2876 1
Table 5 - Correlations in the case of central bank communication
yt t it
yt 1 0.7614 -0.9621
t 0.7614 1 -0.8350
it -0.9621 -0.8350 1
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